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ABSTRACT 
 
Latecomer sectors in late-industrializing economies follow different patterns in their development and 
growth processes, which largely determine the share acquired from the global value chain. The 
development and growth process of the sectors is generally argued to be the result of the interaction of 
macro level specific institutional context and micro level firm strategic choices. In this study I argue that 
meso-level sectoral systems also play a critical role in the development and growth process of latecomer 
sectors. Accordingly, I aim to integrate these three theoretical perspectives -resource-based view (RBV) 
of the firm, sectoral system of innovation (SSI) perspective, and technological capability perspective for 
late industrializing economies- to explain the relative developmental failure of Turkish automotive 
industry compared to other successful latecomer industries such as South Korean automotive industry In 
the light of theoretical framework, I will try to investigate sectoral technological upgrading trajectory and 
compare between Korean and Turkish  automotive industry development path by using case study method. 
I will end by discussing how a multilevel framework that takes into account the systemic factors can guide 
research on sectoral development in late-industrializing countries. In the light of a comparative historical 
analysis of development of Turkish and Korean automotive industries it is argued that a pace of industrial 
transformation can be accelerated by multilevel proactive state intervention. 
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1. Introduction: 
 
    While Asian newly industrialized Economies (NIEs) were similar to the other developing 
countries in the sense that they were all late-industrializing countries in the global economy 
(Hikino and Amsden, 1994, Wong, 1999) some sectors in these economies, such as South 
Korean automotive industry, exemplify a success story while others, such as Turkish automotive 
industry, encounter developmental failures (Erdoğdu,1999). The literature on performance of 
different latecomer sectors in late-industrializing economies suggests that they follow different 
patterns in their technological catch-up processes (e.g., Lee and Lim, 2001). Explanations of this 
performance heterogeneity between sectors generally focus on the interaction of macro level 
specific institutional context and micro level firm strategic choices (Hobday, 2003). A quick 
overview of the literature, however, reveals a surprising lack of an integrative approach that takes 
into account not only macro and micro level perspectives but also meso-level sectoral systems 
approach. In this study I argue that meso-level sectoral systems also play a critical role in the 
development and growth processes of latecomer sectors. Therefore, an integrative framework 
that takes into account the meso-level sectoral systems is needed to provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of sector level performance heterogeneity. Accordingly, I aim to 
integrate three theoretical perspectives, resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, sectoral system 
of innovation (SSI) perspective, and research on institutional context for technological capability 
development for late industrializing economies, to explain the performance heterogeneity of 
latecomer sectors. Specifically, this paper focus on the Turkish automotive industry and aim to 
understand and explain the developmental failure it encounters compared to other successful 
latecomer industries, such as South Korean automotive industry. In this study the path dependent 
sectoral evolution and lock-in dynamics of Turkish automotive industry will be investigated 
(David, 1985; Arthur, 1990) by focusing on the local and global linkages, organizational learning 
and capabilities, interaction among actors, success and failure examples, external and internal 
knowledge sources, and the roles of new actors.  
  The foundation of the automotive industry in South Korea and Turkey has started almost in the 
same period, early 1960s. Progress of this industry in Turkey outdistanced the domestic Korean 
performance until the second half of 1970s. Since then, thanks to flourishing industrial policies 
implemented by the state, the Korean automotive industry entered in a booming growth, and 
turned out to be a prominent industry capable of producing and marketing to every corner of the 
globe its own global brand today. On the other hand, the industry in Turkey remained localized 
as a production base developing in parallel to the strategic decisions of global brands, 
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culminating in the lack of a global automotive industry capable of manufacturing its own brand. 
Automotive industries of these two countries inaugurated at similar initial conditions followed 
utterly different paths and scored distinct performances. This study is aimed at exploring the 
causes underlying these distinct outcomes reached by two late industrialization experiences by 
means of a multilevel theoretical framework. Root causes of these two discrete performances are 
believed to be the governmental incentive policies towards industry at macro level, the skills of 
the late comer firm to exercise its dynamic skills and take strategic decisions at micro level as 
well as selective policies decisive in technological development routes at meso level. 
   This study consists of main three parts. In first section multilevel theoretical framework 
technological upgrading process are investigated. Second section is dedicated to comparative 
analysis of S Korean and Turkish automotive industries. In this section causes of differences 
between two countries’ automotive industry performance are explored via using historical data. 
In the third section an assessment has been made on Korean and Turkish automotive industry 
from SSI perspective and main propositions for conclusion are discussed. Finally fundamental 
characteristics feature of policy space and upgrading relation summarize in conclusion section.   
 
2. Multilevel Analysis of Technological Upgrading in Late-Industrializing Context: 
 
   In the 1990s a large body of research studying the catching up processes of newly 
industrializing Asian countries emerged. These studies particularly focus on the dynamics of firm 
level learning processes (Kim, 1999; Mathews and Cho, 1999), technological capability building 
(Lall, 1992; Lall, 2000; Lall and Teubal, 1998) and national institutional contexts defined as 
national innovation systems (Freeman, 1987; Shin, 1996). These studies were followed by others 
that adopt a sectoral system of Innovation approach. Most of these SSI studies focus on the 
specialized supplier and science based sectors, such as telecommunication equipment and 
services, software, biotechnology and pharmaceutical, petrochemical, and complex machine tool 
production, electronics, and automation (For EU countries as advanced economies see: Tether 
and Metcalfe, 2010; on service; Mckelvey  et al.,2004; on pharmaceutical, Cesaroni et al. ,2004; 
on chemical, Steinmueller,2004; on software, Edquist,2004; on Telecommunications, Wengel 
and  Shapira, 2004 on machine tools ; for  China as a latecomer economies see:  ; Xi et al.,2010 
on automobile; Li and Xin Pu on colour TV, 2010). While this growing literature have helped us 
understand the dynamics of development and performance in the late-industrializing economies, 
an integrative approach that integrates macro, micro and meso-level perspectives to explain the 
sectoral level performance heterogeneity is lacking. Accordingly, I draw on the resource-based 
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view (RBV) of the firm, sectoral system of innovation (SSI) perspective, and research on 
institutional context for technological capability development for late industrializing economies 
to explain the sectoral level performance heterogeneity (The theoretical framework is  illustrated 
in Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Multilevel Theoretical Framework Technological Upgrading 
 
 
Source: author 
 
2.1. Late Industrialization: 
 
The macro level perspective in the theoretical framework focuses on the late-
industrialization problems. The concept "late industrialization" was formulated by Gerschenkron, 
the US economist of Russian origin. Countries like Russia and Germany outdistanced by 
industrializing countries such as UK and France upon the start and growth of the industrial 
revolution, and therefore referring to state intervention in an aim to catch up with these 
prosperous countries are defined as late industrializing countries by Gerschenkron (Keyder, 
1978). According to Gerschenkron, industrialization evident in UK can be achieved in backward 
countries only through the existence of some substitution factors. These factors are banks in 
Germany and principally the government in Russia. (Gerschenkron, 1962). Approaches that may 
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preserves its pivotal essence in these new generation discussions (Fagerberg and Godinho, 
2006:518). For instance, stressing the significance of the capitalist developmental state in 
Japanese industrialization, Chalmers (1982) argues that the strategic industrial policies 
effectively pursued by the state constitute the crucial component of this successful late 
industrialization process.   Debates surrounding this Asian development lay the major emphasis 
on the state's capacity of administrative skills in the industrialization process. And the constituent 
of this capacity is the state power, the existence of relatively autonomous specialist bureaucracy, 
and strong cooperation towards strategic objectives between the business world and private 
sector. This cooperation is what has allowed the implementation of effective industrial policies.  
Late industrialization theory focusing on “technological capability” has been 
conceptualized in the early 1980s (Bell and Pavitt, 1995; Enos 1991; Fransman, 1985; Lall, 1992, 
2000).  The term "technological capabilities" encompasses the wide range of knowledge and 
skills required to acquire, assimilate, utilize, adapt, change and create technology (Lall, 1992). 
These capabilities require a national institutional context that provides certain complementary 
inputs including “organisational flexibility, finance, quality of human resources, support services 
and information management and co-ordination competence” (Juma and Clark, 2002:8). The 
industrial policy is studied across a dichotomous approach, namely "functional" and "selective or 
sector-oriented" interventions. The functional policy set is aimed at eliminating market failures in 
no favour of a selected sector or business. Unlike the functional policy, the structuralist policy 
involves targeting specific sectors or activities by means of various policy instruments such as 
subventions, trade policies, R&D subsidies, etc. (Lall and Teubal, 199) Furthermore, the 
structuralist policy underlines the necessity to effect both functional and selective interventions 
for industrial development, and adopts selective interventions as its priority policy set. 
Consequently, the main process of technological change in late-industrializing countries is 
performed by acquiring and improving technological capabilities via particularly selective 
technological policies (Teubal, 2002). The success of strategic and elective industrial policies is 
underpinned at state freedom from the pressure of interest groups, and collaboration between 
state and private sector across common goals. The critical factor in these country experiences has 
been the state's ability to restrict the "market rationale", considered to be the fundamental 
resource allocation mechanism of neoclassical economics, in line with long-term priorities of 
industrialization based on the strategic vision of the state (Öniş, 1991). The traditional 
neoclassical economics custom has a critical approach to the interventionist state pattern, and 
stresses issues with this intervention including misallocation and productivity losses. Therefore, 
according to this approach, the core duty of the state in developing countries should be to set up 
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proper prices that would allow economic actors to act along true stimuli. However, as indicated 
in Amsden (1993), the state has routed the distribution of resources in these newly industrializing 
countries and intervened in relative prices by applying distinct incentives with a view to boosting 
investments and foreign trade, culminating in the formation of wrong prices. The decisive 
characteristic of newly industrializing Asian countries has been the behaviour avoiding entrusting 
resource allocation to the market mechanism as posited by neoclassical economics. One of the 
key factors of accomplished policies pursued in Eastern Asia has been the attempt to close the 
knowledge gap. These countries have not only resolved the issue of capital shortage but also 
staged conscious endeavours with the aim of employing modern technologies in production 
processes in awareness of current knowledge gaps between developed countries (Stiglitz, 
1986:297).    The companies tended to internalize foreign technologies transferred instead of 
directly employing them. Such technological learning process has constituted the foundation of 
technological skill base.  
Finally, what underlie the success of late industrialization experiences observed outside 
Europe in twenty first century is strategic industrial policies based upon state and private sector 
collaboration. On the other hand, Asian economies have scored major growth achievements by 
implementing comprehensive industrial policies deviating from standard liberal policies besides 
these general principles (Rodrik, 2009). Indeed, similar policies were also practiced in Latin 
American countries in the import substitution period. However, the major difference between 
Eastern Asia and Latin America is not anything caused by industrial transformation led by state 
in one, and by the market in the other. The actual reason is that industrial policies formulated in 
Latin America are not as serious and interrelated as the policies in Eastern Asia, culminating in a 
poorly entrenched transformation in Latin America unlike Eastern Asia (Rodrik, 2009). East 
Asian countries attached major importance to setting vision on economic progress and targets in 
collaboration with private sector. Rather than a detailed planning based on state control, these 
countries have built development schemes with state acting as a catalyst (Stiglitz, 2010:302). 
Therefore, while the state is administering the industrialization process, it should pursue a 
strategy where private sector actors are strictly involved in the decision-making process. Such 
involvement process has offered opportunities to public and private sector in setting objectives 
and selecting the instruments to be employed to attain these objectives. 
2.2. Latecomer Firm and Technological Upgrading Strategies: 
 
   The micro level analysis in my framework focuses on firms in latecomer economies. At 
the micro level resource-based view of the firm provides the analytical tools for analyzing 
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latecomer firm behavior (Mathews, 2002). Classical RBV theory was developed by Penrose 
(1959) almost half a century ago. She assumes that firms compete on the basis of internal 
“resources” that takes time to develop (Penrose, 1959). More recent contributions of RBV theory 
of the firm came from Barney (1986, 1991), Dierickx and Cool (1989), and Peteraf (1993). These 
studies assume that each firm is a collection of key resources and capabilities that determine a 
firm’s strategy. Recent research in the RBV focuses on the dynamic aspects of capabilities 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Dynamic capabilities 
are conceptualized as firm’s ability to build and/or extend basic capabilities in order to deal with 
changing environments (Teece et al., 1997). These firms are argued to be affected by the 
institutional context of their national economies and global producing networks and they effect 
the environment in which they operate. 
   The enterprises of countries in late industrialization process consequentially seem to be the 
latecomer firms of the global economy. Firms coming late due to historical conditions face 
significant restrictions in accessing different sources and technology in early period of 
articulation with global economy. These restrictions limit the access of these firms to foreign 
marketplaces. These firms strive to benefit from advantages such as low labour cost during initial 
periods with a view to catching up with leading companies and turning out to be a global trader. 
Therefore, latecomer firms have some advantages and disadvantages at the start up those leading 
and mature enterprises of current industry do not normally suffer. Opportunities that early comer 
firms have such as customer loyalty, scale advantages inducing learning effect, and smooth 
access to technology and strategic inputs constitute disadvantages for latecomer firms. In 
addition, remoteness to consumer markets with high level of income particularly in developed 
countries and to technology sources produced by various organizations (universities, research 
institutions, etc.), and the paucity of resources that the host country can allocate to infrastructure 
represent other major disadvantages.   On the other hand, in addition to these disadvantages that 
latecomer firms suffer, they enjoy certain advantages brought by making late appearance in the 
industry. Of them, low switching costs that a latecomer firm has contrary to mature enterprises 
represent the foremost one. Economic life sees a rapidly changing set of tastes, preferences and 
production processes (Cho et.al., 1998). Mature companies cannot smoothly demonstrate skills of 
adaptation to environment during the whole rapid environmental transformation due to the 
process which the economics tradition calls "routinised behaviours" (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 
1982). This situation offers advantages to latecomer firms for adaptation to new conditions. 
Additionally, latecomer firms have the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge externality and 
experiences of leading enterprises. In particular, mistakes committed by leading companies 
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during the early period constitute a knowledge source for latecomer firms without any cost 
burden. In addition, low-cost input sources available for newcomer firms constitute another 
major advantage (Cho et.al., 1998). As a result, latecomer firms make their appearance in the 
industry as accompanied with both disadvantages and some advantages (. For latecomer firms to 
catch up with leading enterprises of the industry, these firms should both cope with 
disadvantages associated with late coming and make good use of available advantages. Firms 
capable of successfully employing their dynamic skills and resources in hand catch up with 
leading enterprises and have the opportunity of technological upgrade. The major decisive factor 
in such technological upgrading process is to build up the technological skill based on learning 
process. 
    Decision on strategic decisions of latecomer firms for technological upgrading are the 
conditions surrounding the national economy in which these firms are involved as well as the 
global value chain composition of the industry concerned and the industry's technological regime 
characteristics. For its distinctive aspects, each industry presents separate technological 
upgrading paths for firms. On the other hand, states have the opportunity to manage the 
technological upgrading process along these paths through available selective policy instruments. 
The catching-up process displays a character dependent upon the path determined by historical 
facts and corporate relationships rather than being a linear and unidirectional route. However, by 
making good use of opportunities offered by national and industrial characteristics available to 
them in their operational domain, firms may pursue distinctive catching-up strategies. 
    Achievements scored by latecomer firms in global marketplaces have been discussed 
particularly within the context of Asian countries. Whether these catching-up strategies involve 
certain typologies or not is being explored. Analyses aimed at classifying these typologies are 
carried out on firm scale at micro level. However, since these classifications focus both on the 
characteristics of industries and the role of public policies during this upgrading process, they put 
into play the meso- and macro-level as well. To this end, Hobday (1995)   developed a tripartite 
technological upgrading typology upon his researches on the Korean electronic industry.  In this 
typology, firms go through three different phases, enhance the technological skills they gain at 
each phase and turn out to be pioneering players in the global marketplace.   At the first phase, 
“Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM)”, firms start by undertaking contact manufacturing 
or contracted installation jobs for the major buyer within an environment where detailed 
properties of the product design are provided.  The second phase attained by the firms is defined 
as “Original Design Manufacturing (ODM)”. At this phase, firms enhance their product design 
capabilities in parallel to the skill growth introduced by learning dynamics, and upgrade to the 
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phase of design customization according to product specifications provided by buyer firms. The 
final phase is “Original Brand Manufacturing (OBM)” where the firm appears in global 
marketplaces with its own brand. Own brand development is the last step of the technological 
upgrading process. Thanks to the technological capabilities gained, firms initially standing as 
merely manufacturers become capable of producing under their own brands and entrust 
manufacturing jobs with low added value to their suppliers. 
   Wong (1999) criticized Hobday's typology for it generalizes the transformation in the 
electronics industry and suggests the process of manufacturing the own brand as a common final 
objective for all firms. Wong developed five different technological upgrading typologies 
predicated on the source-based firm approach arguing that firms can enter distinctive growth 
processes by mobilizing their specific sources (Wong, 1999:6-10). 
    1. Reverse Value Chain Strategy: 
  The tripartite technological upgrading model developed by Hobday constitutes the first 
typology of Wong's approach. Namely, firms evolve from the OEM phase to the OBM phase. 
2. Reverse Product Life Cycle Strategy: 
   In this strategy that is a major type of the reverse value chain model, the latecomer firm may 
turn out to be a fast follower in the product market, close the gap between and even exceed the 
leading firm. Latecomer firms start with manufacturing mature products by either acquiring 
technology license or learning processes through mimicking. Initial products of these firms are 
those not containing state-of-the-art technologies and generally targeting low-opportunity market 
segments. Such sort of a market penetration strategy gives the firms the opportunity to preserve 
low-cost manufacturing advantages against the pioneer. With the development of mature 
products and process technologies, firms seek ways to manufacture more technology-intensive 
products. As a result of following the development path of the technologically pioneer firm 
through highly-concentrated learning processes and mimicking its R&D operations, the firms 
start to close the technological gap between the pioneer firm. For this upgrading process to come 
up with success, unlike the reverse value chain model, the firm has to develop its product and 
process technologies simultaneously. The Japanese and Korean automotive and 
telecommunications industry may be suggested as an example to such kind of an upgrading 
strategy. 
3. Process Technology Pioneering Strategy: 
     So as to avoid the risks caused by investments for product development, branding and 
marketing to be made with the aim of producing their own brands, the firms may specialize in 
production processes and adopt only the specialized producer status.   The firms may turn out to 
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be specialized producers by means of acquiring the latest process technologies and employing 
these capabilities in production processes such that the best performance demanded by the 
market is demonstrated instead of allocating resources to product development technologies. 
Firms need process R&D efforts to become technology pioneers. Best example to this strategy is 
the production-specialized electronic suppliers active in Singapore. 
4) Product Technology Pioneering: 
 In developing countries, most of the firms tend to avert from a process as tough as developing 
product technologies. This strategy is characterized with the common behaviour of the firms to 
endeavour to outdistance each other through the products they develop thanks to radical product 
innovations, or to enhance their existing products across progressive innovations.  
5) Application Pioneering Strategy: 
 In this strategy, firms head towards technological upgrading through adapting current 
technologies to new areas instead of acting in new product areas. 
 
Figure 2: Generic Technological Capability Development Strategies of Latecomer Firms 
from Late Industrializing Economies 
 
 
Sourse: Wong, 1999:30 
    
Such distinctive development strategies may display transitions throughout the process. The 
thriving latecomer firms of East Asia have implemented the policy sets of different strategies at 
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most prefer pursuing the same strategy in the long-term. Implementing different strategies as a 
whole would provide mutual benefits due to the relationships of complementarities. Clustering of 
the firms capable of demonstrating technological upgrading of a country in a certain industrial 
line, and enhanced position of that country's firms in the global value chain may be described as 
the occurrence of technological upgrading at industrial level. For instance, technological 
upgrading achieved by certain Korean firms such as LG and Samsung in the electronics industry 
trigger the technological upgrading of the Korean electronics industry as a whole. While this 
industry turns out to be one of the major sectors of the country in terms of value added generated 
and employment export income, decisive standing of domestic firms in global value chain also 
makes it possible for the Korean state's decisions for supporting these firms as a whole to act on 
the governance composition of the value chain. 
 
2.3. Sectoral System of Innovation and Technological Upgrading from Late-Industrializing 
Perspective: 
 
 Sectoral System of Innovation approach provides theoretical background for meso-level 
conceptualization for technological upgrading. Some studies in the literature adopt a perspective 
that focuses on the relationship between “sectoral specificities” and “value chain governance” 
while analyzing upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000). A SIS is a set of new and established 
products for specific uses and the set of agents carrying out market and non-market interactions 
for the creation, production and sale of those products. “A sectoral system has a knowledge base, 
technologies, inputs and an existing, emergent and potential demand” (Malerba, 2004: 16). The 
SIS approach contributes to the crucial idea that regarding all technological or sectoral systems 
as homogenous is not true. In SIS perspective, the conditions for innovations; one industry in one 
country has much more in common with the same industry in another country than with another 
industry in its own country. Moreover, SIS approach suggests that different industries may not 
have only different competitive advantages, interactive and organizational boundaries but also 
different sources of innovation and users’ needs (Chang and Chen, 2004: 22). 
As a result, it is claimed that there are two starting points about industrial sectors (Malerba, 
2002): 
1. Sectors are characterized by specific knowledge bases, technologies, production 
processes, complementariness, and demand by a population of heterogeneous firms and 
non-firm organizations and by institutions. 
2. Sectors greatly differ from each other in several of these dimensions. 
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All innovation systems have building blocks. Sectoral innovation system is composed of three 
main building blocks (Malerba 2004:10-12):  
 
a. Knowledge and technological domain 
b. Actors and networks 
c. Institutions 
a. Knowledge and technological domain:  
   Any sector or industry could be characterized by a specific knowledge base, technologies and 
inputs. All of them shape the dynamics of a SSI and its spatial boundaries s defined as a 
technological regime (Breschi and Malerba, 1997: 132).It is composed by the opportunity 
conditions (likelihood for innovations), the appropriability conditions (possibilities of protecting 
innovations), the cumulativeness of technological knowledge (relation between today’s and 
future innovation in specific sectors and along technological trajectories) and the relevant 
knowledge base. The latter relate the nature of the knowledge leading innovation at firm level. It 
involves various degree of specificity, tacitness, complexity. Each sector operates under a 
different regime. In respect to spatial aspects they emphasize the geographical concentration of 
innovators and their ‘knowledge spatial boundaries’, the search space for relevant knowledge that 
firms require for their innovation process Technological which regime is the main determinant of 
sectoral pattern of innovation coming from Schumpeterian tradition .Schumpeterian legacy focus 
on   differences market structures and innovation dynamics among industries (It summarize in 
Table 1). Technological regime can be divided into two main types as Schumpeter Mark I and 
Schumpeter Mark II.  Schumpeter Mark I is characterized by “creative destruction” with 
technological ease of entry and a fundamental role played by entrepreneurs and new firms in 
innovative activities. Schumpeter Mark II is instead characterized by “creative accumulation” 
with the prevalence of large established firms and the presence of relevant barriers to entry to 
new innovators (Breschi, et al, 2000:388). 
b. Actors and networks.  
  A sector is composed of heterogeneous agents that are organisations and individuals (e.g. 
consumers, entrepreneurs, scientists). Organisations may be firms (e.g. users, producers and input 
suppliers) and non-firm organisations (e.g. universities, financial institutions, government 
agencies, trade-unions, or technical associations), including sub-units of larger organisations (e.g. 
R-D or production departments) and groups of organizations (e.g. industry associations) 
(Malerba,2006).  
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Table 1: Schumpeterian Modes of Technological Regimes 
 
 
Schumpeter  Mark I 
Creative Destruction 
Schumpeter  Mark II  
Creative Accumulation 
 
 
Fundamental 
Factors of 
Technological 
Regimes 
 High opportunity conditions  
 Low appropriability conditions 
 Low Cumulativeness  (Firm level )  
 
 Knowledge base (specific, codified, 
simple) 
 High opportunity conditions  
 High appropriability conditions 
 High Cumulativeness  (Firm level )  
 
 Knowledge base (generic. tacit, 
complex) 
 
 
 
 
 
Main Features 
of Industry 
 Low concentration of innovative 
activities  
 Many innovators  
 Highly turbulent population of  
innovators 
 Many SMEs  
 High entry to industry 
 Low concentration of  capital  
 High instability in the hierarchy of 
innovator 
 High concentration of innovative 
activities  
 Few innovators 
 Rather stable population of  
innovators 
 Large scale firms 
 entry barriers to industry 
 High concentration of  capital  
 Stability in the hierarchy of innovator 
 
Source of 
Technological 
Change 
 
 Entrepreneur-based technological 
change 
 
 Routinized technological change,  
 
Examples 
 Machine Tool  
 Fabricated Metal Products Industry 
 Furniture Manufacturing Industry 
 Textile and Apparel Industry 
 Chemical Industry  
  Automotive Industry  
  Electric Machine  Industry 
 
Root 
Literature 
 
Schumpeter (1912) ; Schumpeter (1928) 
 
Schumpeter (1942) 
Source: Prepared from   Breshi and  Malerba 1997, Malerba and  Orsenigo 1995, Audretsch 1997 
 
c. Institutions:  
   Institutions are defined by North (1991) as “the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interactions”. They involve formal constraints (e.g rules, laws, and constitutions), 
informal constraints (e.g norms of behavior, conventions, self –imposed codes of conduct) and 
their enforcement characteristics”. (North, 1994: 360). Institutions have important affects on 
economic performance through history. Three sets of institutions are defined in SSI) .Institutions 
deal with the provision of the basic good use in innovation activities namely scientific and 
technological knowledge ( The System of Intellectual Property Rights) and organize the 
financing of innovations and corporate governance mechanisms in innovations (Financial market 
or banks) finally it concern with the provision of human resources and the ways that can be used 
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in different industrial relation systems (Labour market regulations, Education system). (Coriat 
and Weinstein 2004: 332) 
   These building blocks approach draw broad framework for understanding sectoral development 
dynamics which would aid policy formulation from economic development perspective. The 
most important conclusion of his approach emphasizes on the need for sector-specific technology 
policies which should aim to build SSI in selective industries. SSI as a development strategy 
provides various policy tools for increasing innovation capacity at sectoral level. In sum, because 
of technological spillover, SSI especially in science-based sectors, accelerates not only sectoral 
performance but also whole economic performance. 
As a result, different industries have different technological regimes and sources of 
innovation. For this reason, designing sector specific policies is required. These sector specific 
policies are also influential on upgrading Global Value Chain. GVC based analysis provides an 
analytical framework which heeds to the structure and power relations within a network of firms 
involved in the development, production and marketing of a product(s) created in a global 
production system (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Gereffi, 1994; 1999; 2003; Gereffi et 
al.2005).“The value chain theory of governance suggests that relationships between leading 
firms and suppliers differ across sectors due to the particular characteristics of the production 
processes and the organization of the sector, such as the sophistication and availability of the 
technology involved, the existence or absence of (technical and process) standards, and the 
extent to which rapid turnaround time or speed to market is essential to competitiveness” (Bair, 
2005: 163). The goal is to explain variation across sectors in terms of how global production is 
organized and managed and how firms improve their technological level. In this framework, 
technological upgrading of late-comer firm is achieved through learning dynamics and 
technological capability building. This global business environment provides context for firms in 
which they can make technological upgrading in global value chain by using dynamic 
capabilities.  Gereffi et al. (2005) attempted to develop a typology of five governance structures 
that describe the network relationships linking suppliers in global industries to lead firms. This 
typology is based on the possible combinations resulting from variations (measured as ‘low’ or 
‘high’) in three independent variables: the complexity of transactions, the codifiability of 
information and the capability of suppliers. The value chain theory of governance suggests that 
relationships between leading firms and suppliers differ across sectors due to the particular 
characteristics of the production processes and the organization of the sector, such as the 
sophistication and availability of the technology involved, the existence or absence of (technical 
and process) standards, and the extent to which rapid turnaround time or speed to market is 
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essential to competitiveness. The goal is to explain variation across sectors in terms of how 
global production is organized and managed and how firms improve their technological level 
(Bair, 2005: 163). 
  GVC framework, in addition, is fruitful for the crafting of effective policy tools concerning 
industrial upgrading. The concept of upgrading—making better products, making them more 
efficiently, or moving into more skilled activities—has often been used in studies on 
competitiveness (Kaplinsky  and  Morris, 2001; Porter, 1990).Following this approach, 
upgrading is decisively related to innovation. So upgrading is defined as innovating to increase 
value added. Enterprises achieve this in various ways, such as, for example, by entering higher 
unit value market niches or new sectors, or through undertaking new productive functions. The 
concept of upgrading may be effectively described for enterprises working within a value chain, 
where four types of upgrading are singled out (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000): 
 
 Process upgrading is transformation of inputs into outputs more efficiently by reorganizing 
the production system or introducing superior technology (Schmitz, 1999). 
 Product upgrading is moving into more sophisticated product lines in terms of increased 
unit values (Gereffi, 1999). 
 Functional upgrading is acquiring new, superior functions in the chain, such as design or 
marketing or abandoning existing low-value added functions to focus on higher value 
added activities (Bair and Gereffi, 2001). 
 Intersectoral upgrading is applying the competence acquired in a particular function to 
move into a new sector. ( Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002).  
 
 
4. A Comparative Analysis of Automotive Industry between Korea and Turkey: 
 
    4.1. The South Korean Automotive Industry: Development and Current Situation 
 
Today, the Korean economy stands out with its taskforce functioning as research and 
development-oriented and its highly sophisticated industrial infrastructure in plenty of fields 
ranging from textile to chemistry, from heavy industry to IT technologies (Chung, 2003). While 
standing as a basically underdeveloped country in late 1950s, Korea today displays the position 
of a country manufacturing state-of-the-art products to every corner of the world through a 
thriving growth strategy. The review of Korea's economical development process reveals three 
major factors underlying this achievement. These are the state's inarguable role in shaping the 
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business world, the finance system under stringent control of banks, and the monopoly created by 
prominent family enterprises called cheabol1 (Hahm, 2003:79).  
  The Korean2 state intervened in resource distribution through industrial and technological 
policies it pursued. Investment schemes developed through state coordination determined the 
priorities of long-term development plans. All incentives extended by the state to the private 
sector were tied to distinctive performance criteria, and state consistently transferred data to the 
private sector through the technical competence framework it has. Such kind of competence 
exchange has allowed efficient data transfer through social networks built between the private 
sector and public institutions.  The state made available to chaebols both its financial resources 
and loans acquired from the abroad through state banks at interest rates that are much favourable 
compared to the free market. Consistently receiving incentives through various mechanisms, 
chaebols started to control the Korean economy. Chaebols became the driving motive for 
industrialization in labour-intensive sectors particularly during the initial phases of the 
industrialization process. And Korean state supported the set-up of Cheaobol-type enterprise 
organizations for the sake of ensuring rapid economical development. Such kind of enterprises 
attract the best trained and qualified human source, and enjoy major advantages in technology 
transfer, assimilation of the technology transferred, and financing. In addition, as Cheabols 
incorporate several subsidiaries, they could avail of cross-financing opportunities by reflecting a 
particular profit derived through a subsidiary involved in a sector into another sector for 
investment purposes (Won-Young, 2000).  
Thanks to the organizational, technical and financial sources they have, these giants assumed 
critical roles in the international expansion process of the Korean economy. 
     The development quest of Korea displayed an evolution from imitation to innovation. 
Throughout its development process where we initially see efforts for imitating products in 
developed countries, Korea proceeded with putting forward an authentic model without 
dependency to foreign investors, and prioritizing the learning of technology (Mathews, 1999).  
Methods including endeavours to figure out the technology product, workbenches and machines 
through reverse engineering were also employed in technology development. Local research and 
development initiatives played a decisive role in enhancing the technological know-how acquired 
                                               
1 The chaebol are the large, conglomerate family-controlled firms of South Korea characterized by strong ties with 
government agencies. The chaebol means “business association” in Korean language. There were family-owned 
enterprises in Korea in the period before 1961 but the particular state-corporate alliance came into being with the 
regime of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979). Park modeled this arrangement on the zaibatsu system which developed in 
Japan during the Meiji Era. There were significant differences between the zaibatsu and the chaebol, the most 
significant of which was the source of capital. The zaibatsu were organized around a bank for their source of capital. 
The chaebol in contrast were prohibited from owning a bank. 
 
 16
during the early period. Particularly throughout the process to date since 1980s, both the 
noteworthy rise in R&D expenditures and rapid switch to advanced technological products 
yielding high value added in both production and export buttressed these developments in the 
R&D system (Hobday  et. al., 2004). 
 
Table 2: The Current Status of Auto Manufacturers in Korea (2010) 
 
* Daewoo Motors ( established in 1972)  was bought by General Motors Corporation in 2002 and the company was renamed GM 
Daewoo.   GM Daewoo renamed itself to GM Korea in 2011, all GM Daewoo products are sold in South Korea as 
Chevrolets. **Samsung (1998) sold a seventy percent stake in the company to Renault in September 2000, and the company was 
renamed Renault Samsung Motors 
Source: Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (KAMA), 2011 Korea's Automotive Industry 
   
      The automotive industry has a special standing in this highly-accomplished industrialization 
experience of Korea. After USA, Europe and Japan which one can depict as the prominent base 
of the automotive industry, Korea is the first country to build up an automotive industry staging a 
 
Hyundai Kia GM Korea* 
Ssangyong 
Motor 
Renault 
Samsung** 
The year of 
foundation 
1967 1944 2002 1954 2000 
Initial 
License for 
Production 
-- Ford&Mazda Honda Mercedes-Benz Nissan 
Location 
Ulsan, Jeonju, 
Asan 
Gwangmyeong, 
Hwaseong, 
Gwangju 
Gunsan, 
Changwon, 
Bupyeong  
Pyeongtaek, 
Changwon  
Busan 
No. of employees 56,482 32,599 17,030 4,698 7,582 
Types of vehicles 
produced 
Passenger cars, 
SUV, CDV, 
buses, trucks, 
CSVs 
Passenger cars, 
SUV, CDV, 
buses, trucks, 
CSVs 
Passenger cars, 
CDV,buses, 
trucks 
Passenger cars, 
SUV 
Passenger cars, 
SUV 
Sales (KRW 
billion) 
36,769 23,261 12,597 2,070 5,168 
Net income 
(KRW billion) 
5,267 2,254 586 8 36 
Production 
capacity(Korea, 
1,000 units) 
1,858 1,580 915 110 30 
Production 
(1,000 units) 
1,743 1,417 744 80 275 
Domestic 
demand (1,000 
units) 
660 485 126 32 156 
Exports (1,000 
units) 
1,073 920 611 48 116 
Overseas 
factories 
China, India, 
Turkey USA, 
Czech Republic 
China, Slovakia, 
USA 
- - - 
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global brand.   Through policy sets based upon the internalization of learning processes and 
targeting the development of technology, South Korea has turned out to be a global manufacturer 
in the automotive industry (Kim, 1998). Current progress attained by Korea in the global 
automotive market pushed the country to the fifth rank after China, USA, Japan and Germany in 
the classification of prominent global manufacturers with a manufacturing capacity of 4,657,094 
vehicles as at 2011. The biggest automotive giant of Korea, Hyundai-KIA is ranked fourth after 
Toyota, GM and Volkswagen among biggest automotive enterprises of the world with a total 
manufacturing capacity of 5,764,918 vehicles as at 2010 (OICA,2011). The Korean automotive 
industry owes this achievement to an industrial development plan well managed by the state from 
the very beginning. 
   In the Korean automotive industry, the first prominent step was taken when the Five-Year Plan 
for the Car Industry was elaborated in 1962. So as to support this plan, the state enacted the Car 
Industry Conservation Law on the same year. The plan introduced rules as to penetration into the 
automotive sector, car and spare part quality, regulation of production costs, prohibition of car 
imports and duty-free imports of replacement parts not domestically manufactured. Furthermore, 
the state imposed the rule requiring majority share of domestic manufacturers for car assembly, 
and paved the way for the foundation of the Korean Car Manufacturers Society. The maiden car 
assembly plant was put into play under technical collaboration with Japan's Nissan, and started 
production in 1962. The state selected one manufacturer for the manufacturing of each of low 
and medium-volume car segments and diesel engines.  
 The “Car Industry Development Plan” was proclaimed in 1964. Regulations proposed in the 
plan included associating spare part manufacturers with a single assembler, state subsidies for 
spare part manufacturers, and requirement for the domestic demand to be met by a single 
assembler. In 1966, the domestic contribution tariff was elaborated, and incentives were 
associated with domestic contribution rates.  In 1967, the assembler monopoly was liquidated, 
and other firms were also allowed to set up assembly lines. However, the requirement ruling that 
firms should be linked with developed countries to set up an assembly line was imposed. Same 
year, foundation of Hyundai Motor Company was permitted subject to the requirement of setting 
up a car plant under cooperation with Ford. In 1969, the "Master Subsidy Plan for the Car 
Industry" was proclaimed. The plan suggested the set-up of a motor plant, car body construction, 
manufacturing of spare parts fully by domestic producers, and development of a single car 
model. In the plan, estimated schedule of fully domestic manufacturing would be 1972 for small 
cars, and 1974 for standard cars (Green, 1992).  
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When efforts for collaboration with foreign firms failed, Hyundai, commissioned with the 
mission to upgrade the automotive sector, decided to develop its own model in 1973, and 
transferred technology from Japan's Mitsubishi for manufacturing 1,2 l engines. The "Long-Term 
Car Industry Plan" was adopted. The plan was suggesting a domestic contributory share of more 
than 90% in late 1970s, and the rise of a pioneering export industry in early 1980s. Passenger car 
manufacture was limited to three companies. Import of parts that can be domestically 
manufactured at a satisfactory level of quality was banned. Through technologies transferred 
from Japan, UK and Italy, Hyundai succeeded to manufacture the maiden Korean car, Pony, in 
1976. Korea started to export cars below cost due to market failure. Late 1970s saw the export of 
Pony cars to a vast global network of 46 countries primarily represented by developing countries. 
Starting with the second half of 1980s, Hyundai, developing its design technology in Excel, 
succeeded to market Accent, its own model, to the whole world under the affordable car 
segment. 1980s saw the globalization of the Korean automotive industry (Kim, 1998).  
 
   Table 3: Spiral Process of Organizational Learning In Catching-up a Hyundai Motor 
 
Source: Kim, 1998:514 
 
In 1986, Japan introduced voluntary export restrictions under the pressure of the US state. Such 
practice emerged as a major opportunity for Korea, and the country scored a substantial growth 
within the US market in the low-cost vehicle segment. 
 
Phase 1 Phase  2 Phase  3 
 
Phase  4 
 
 
Cars produced  
 
Ford Cortina 
 
Pony 
 
Excel 
 
Accent 
 
Technology 
mastered 
Assembly technology 
Initial design 
technology 
Deepening design 
technology 
Own design 
Time period  1967–1976 1973–1985 1980–1994 1984–1995 
 
Learning Stages 
Preparation 
Poaching experienced 
personnel, literature 
review, observation 
tours 
 
Literature review 
observation tour, 
hiring foreign 
expatriates 
Literature review 
observation tour 
Poaching scientists 
literature review 
Acquisition 
Packaged technology 
transfer, hiring 
foreign 
expatriates 
Unpackaged 
technology transfer 
Unpackaged 
technology transfer 
  Acquisition by 
research overseas 
R&D, hiring foreign 
Expatriates 
 
Assimilation research Learning by doing Learning by doing Learning by doing 
Learning by 
research 
Improvement/Application Learning by doing Learning by doing Learning by doing 
Learning by 
research 
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    After the development of the first own-design vehicle, Hyundai, the steam engine of the 
Korean automotive industry, prioritized in-house R&D efforts. In particular, the R&D 
investments towards the development of the engine technology played a decisive role in the 
success of the catching-up strategy. What underlies the technological upgrading process achieved 
by the Korean automotive industry under the leadership of Hyundai is the assignment of a great 
deal of resources to R&D projects directed to a particular objective. Through its R&D project for 
engine development, Hyundai managed to catch up with pioneer enterprises in the industry. At 
the time the engine development project was inaugurated, the carburetor-based engine 
technology was a standard in the world. However, across the awareness that the growing trend is 
in favour of injection-based engine technology, the firm devised a R&D initiative oriented 
towards developing this sophisticated engine.  When this R&D project came up with success, the 
then current engine technology gap between the pioneer enterprises of the sector could be closed 
in a short time (Lee and Lim 2001). 
    By applying consistent, systematic and well-targeted interventions in the sector, and 
implementing sector-specific exhaustive industrial policies, the state supported the learning 
processes in the sector and ensured the internalization of the technology. For instance, when the 
Asian Motor company suffered a financial trouble in 1976, the state induced pressure on KIA to 
acquire this company with a view to pulling the latter out of the passenger cars market. Again 
with a similar method, the state inhibited the collective investment scheme proposed between 
Samsung and Chrysler. The strategic standing of the sector in favour of country's development 
led to inhibition by state of the decisions of companies that would result in the deviation of long-
term development plans. 
  During the period of support, the Korean state and the officials of economy bureaucracy 
collectively employed distinct policy instruments to convey the industry to long-term 
development targets. Such policy practices were pursued and finalized along a particular sectoral 
plan. Policies aimed at routing the sector are determined also by external global dynamics. 
Nonetheless, in the Korean case, this situation has not caused a weakening administrative 
capacity of the state. For instance, the Korean state put into play a scheme for the liberalization 
of foreign trade scheme to kick off a trade war with USA. The officials of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry advised the firms on and preliminarily prepared them for the prospective 
liberalization and deregulation period. In addition, triggered by liberalization in foreign trade in 
1980s, the customs tariff rate of 200% on passenger vehicles was dropped below 15% in 1990s, 
yet the conservation of domestic trade remained under conservation through non-tariff hurdles 
against foreign luxury vehicles (Erdoğdu, 1999:65). In the Korean automotive industry 
 20
demonstrating a substantial enhancement through successful cooperation between the state and 
private sector, overseas expansion speeded up in 1990s. Triggered by liberalization policies put 
into play during this period, automotive firms financed their increased capacities through 
borrowing, yet close state relationships with chebols accelerated the borrowing process. The 
Asian crisis that broke out in 1997 severely impacted the sector. The industry again went into a 
restructuring depending on mergers and acquisitions under tough conditions revealed by the 
financial crisis. Hyundai acquired KIA experiencing financial issues followed by the acquisition 
of Daewo Motor by US GM, changing its title into GM Korea. And Samsung Motor went into a 
partnership with France's Renault (KAMA, 2011). Thanks to the acceleration brought into 
existence by merger with Hyundai and Kia turned out to be the fourth biggest global 
manufacturer and named to be a prestigious brand with its new vehicles of different segments 
globally marketed. A prominent indicator of the success achieved by the automotive industry of 
South Korea, Hyundai developed its own-design car and turned out to be a global car 
manufacturer. 
4.2. Turkish Automotive Industry: Development and Current Situation 
 
     During the industrialization process, the state intensively intervened in economy in Turkey 
too. Through the protectionism and other macro-economic policy instruments applied 
particularly during   the period between 1960 and 1980 called as the import substitution 
industrialization era, the state intervened in the resource allocation mechanism (Şenses, 1989). 
However, like in the Latin American countries case, no performance criteria was sought in 
incentives granted in Turkey. No private sector-public cooperation network that would be 
capable of setting the balance between the short-term profit impulse of private sector and the 
developmental state's long-term quest for financial development could be established, and profits 
generated through interventions in resource allocation mechanism were shared in the private 
sector depending on relationships with the political government (Öniş, 1992). Such disunity of 
the state and the private sector, and autonomous nature of economy bureaucracy avoided guiding 
the economy across long-term strategic targets. On the other hand, while state imposed customs 
tariffs for the whole economy, it did not opt to implement an industrial policy targeting any 
strategic sector, but pursued functional policies instead. With liberalization policies kicked off in 
early 1980, the developmental state paradigm was abandoned and the neo-liberal policy set with 
its genesis in the “Washington Consensus” was put into play instead. Weak incentive practices 
far from catching up with the technological breakthrough prevailing around the globe and 
targeted to sectors that might boost the international competitive edge exhibit the state's failure to 
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devise strategies and plans in line with development priorities (Atalay and Turan, 2003). 
Industrial policies followed by the state were concentrated on the redistribution of profits 
generated instead of focusing on learning dynamics that would elevate the technological skill 
level. For this reason, private sector enterprises headed towards rant-seeking behaviors rather 
than building strategies aimed at long-term technological transformation (Öniş, 1998). This 
situation transformed the Turkish industry into a rather foreign-oriented state; culminating in the 
fact that overall development of the country was guided by decisions taken by prominent firms of 
pivotal developed countries. In other words, industrialization proposed by this model occurred in 
the form of specialization in manufacturing industry activities abandoned by advanced countries 
like in the “Product Life Cycle Theory” developed by Raymond Vernon (Vernon, 1963). In 
1980s, Turkey became the production and export base of textile and garment industry 
discontinued by developed countries, and then a automotive manufacturing and export base in 
the second half of 1990s as a result of the fact that global enterprises shifted their manufacturing 
processes within the automotive industry to developing countries. However, such 
industrialization patterns taking place in Turkey appeared as a derivative result of new “division 
of labour” processes occurring in the global manufacturing system rather than being a crop of the 
domestic technological effort and national industrial policies. Following this industrialization 
model, the Turkish automotive industry scored a progress in another development path of the 
Korean automotive industry.  
   The Turkish automotive sector is one of the economy’s pioneering sectors. It is highly 
international and around 76 percent of Turkish vehicle production in 2011 was exported, mainly 
to Europe. Turkey produced 1,124,982 motor vehicles in 2010, ranking as the 7th largest 
automotive producer in Europe; behind Germany (5,819,614), France (3,174,260), Spain 
(2,770,435), the United Kingdom (1,648,388), Russia (1,508,358) and Italy (1,211,594), 
respectively (AMA, 2011). There are currently 14 passenger and commercial vehicle 
manufacturers in the country, in addition to two main tractor manufacturers. The total capacity of 
the OSD members amounts to 1,561,155 vehicles as of 2010. These manufacturers, together with 
the spare part producers, employ more than 265,000 people, ranking in the top 10 globally. The 
four main producers are Ford Otosan (US; mainly Transit commercial vehicles); Oyak-Renault 
(France;passenger cars only); Tofas, a joint-venture between Fiat (Italy) and the Koc Holding 
conglomerate (mainly LCVs and also passenger cars); and Toyota (Japan; passenger cars). The 
four main manufacturers accounted for approximately 88 percent of all vehicles manufactured in 
Turkey in 2010. 
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Table 4: Auto Manufacturers in Turkey 
 
Manufacturers 
The 
Production 
Place 
The year 
of 
foundation 
License for 
Production 
Foreign 
Capital 
(%) 
Operation 
Type 
Types of vehicles 
produced 
A I O S Kocaeli 1966 Isuzu 29,74 JV Pick Up, Midi-Bus 
ASKAM Kocaeli 1964 Hıno 0 License , trucks, LCV 
B M C İzmir 1966 -- 0 License buses, trucks, MCV 
FORD OTOSAN 
Kocaeli 
Eskişehir 
1983 Ford 41 JV 
Passenger cars, 
trucks, LCV 
HONDA 
TURKEY 
Kocaeli 1997 Honda 100 FDI Passenger cars 
HYUNDAI 
ASSAN Kocaeli 1997 Hyundaı 70 JV Passenger cars, LCV 
KARSAN Bursa 1966 Peugeot, Hyundaı 0 License  buses, trucks, MCV 
MAN TURKEY Ankara 1966 Man 99,9 FDI buses, trucks, 
M BENZ 
TURKEY İstanbul 1968 Mercedes Benz 85 JV buses, trucks 
OTOKAR Sakarya 1963 Deutz,Landrover 0 License buses, trucks, CDV, 
OYAK 
RENAULT 
Bursa 1971 Renault 51 JV Passenger cars,  
TEMSA Adana 1987 Temsa,Mıtsubıshı 0 License buses, trucks 
FIAT TOFAŞ Bursa 1971 Fiat 37,8 JV Passenger cars ,CDV 
TOYOTA Sakarya 1994 Toyota 100 FDI 
Passenger cars, 
buses, trucks 
Source: Automotive Manufacturers Association (AMA)  
 
   
 In Turkey, the automotive sector started manufacturing in the midst of 1950s, and the 
manufacturing process started to pick speed in midst 1960s. After the manufacturing of some 
prototype vehicles in 1950s, the first assembly line was set up for the supply of jeep and pickup 
trucks to armed forces in 1954, followed by truck and then bus assembly in 1955 and 1963 
respectively, and assembly plants manufacturing passenger cars (Tofaş-Fiat, Oyak-Renault, 
Otosan-Ford) started their fabrication activitie within the following three years (Demirer and 
Aydoğan, 2006).  In 1966, the automotive industry started the assembly of its own designs, and 
the maiden domestic car of that period "Anadol" was manufactured by Otosan. Two major car 
manufacturers, Tofaş and Oyak-Renault set up their manufacturing lines in 1971 under Italian 
and French licenses respectively. At the beginning, an import substitution assembly industry was 
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at the focus. During this period, the domestic market was protected through high customs tariffs, 
and great majority of the manufacture was devoted to the domestic market. While investments 
grew the manufacturing capacity of the sector, firms involved in the subsidiary industry started to 
manufacture the parts previously imported. The sector started overseas expansion in parallel to 
the liberalization policies implemented in 1980s (Çetiner 1996). State support for the automotive 
industry started to recede in the second half of 1970s. As a result of the abandonment of import 
substitution policies in early 1980s and liberalization of the economy, state's role as a guiding 
actor in economy started to decline. Industries failing to satisfactorily compete in parallel to the 
abandonment of the developmental state paradigm in Turkish economy headed towards foreign 
competition, and foreign trade rise in some labour-intensive sectors could only be ensured 
through incentives. The market role started to rise versus the diminishing state role in resource 
allocation, and the Turkish automotive industry was shaped not by long-term development 
objectives but by strategic decisions of global own brand manufacturers in this framework 
(Tuncel and Olmezogulları, 2011). 
Number and production capacities of key industry firms displayed a consistent rise until 
early 1990s thanks to a strong domestic trade. Through direct investments of global 
manufacturers such as Toyota, Honda and Opel, the sector started to flourish. And prominent 
enterprises such as Fiat, Renault and Ford started to acquire the shares of domestic key industry 
firms. Starting with 1990s, export opportunities rose, yet the 1994 crisis led to a severe shrinkage 
in the sector (Duruiz, 1999). 
   The period when the Turkish automotive sector started to become integrated with the global 
manufacturing system commences with the execution of the Customs Union Convention in 1996. 
As a result of the shrinking domestic demand due to the impact of the 1994 crisis, domestic 
manufacturers started to head towards foreign markets (Mckınsey Global Institute, 2003). The 
sector underwent a strategic transformation and an export-oriented strategy was kicked off. 
Depending on this strategy, domestic manufacturers followed the global manufacturing system 
and displayed a faster integration (Azcanli, 1995). Driven by the factors such as proximity to 
Europe, export potential, qualified taskforce, the sector turned out to be the steam engine of 
export today.  Today, the key automotive industry hosts 18 firms. Almost all of these firms 
manufacturing cars, light-weight commercial vehicles, heavy commercial vehicles, buses and 
tractors perform under the license of a foreign giant.  
     Since the automotive industry was incorporated in the form of an assembly industry of the 
global own brand manufacturers resident in Turkey, and as its progress took place along the path 
designated by the initial conditions upon corporate structure, it set its sight on manufacturing 
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cheap and low-quality vehicles directed to the national domestic market instead of creating a 
global brand. This vision led to the panorama that, as triggered by overseas expansion starting 
with the second half of 1990s, the Turkish automotive industry manufacturing under the license 
of global firms transformed into a manufacturing base shaped in line with the decisions taken by 
these players instead of a global actor. 
 
 
4. An Assessment of Technological Upgrading from the conceptual SSI Framework: S 
Korea and Turkey 
 
  The reasons underlying the deep difference between automotive industries of Korea and Turkey 
with respect to their current progress worldwide will be analyzed by means of the model 
developed around the sectoral innovation system. As mentioned earlier, the data infrastructure of 
an industrial innovation system is made up of actors, networks and institutions. Besides this 
composition, demand to the products of the industry also constitutes a major component of the 
system. It is argued according to the multi-level approach suggested within the framework of the 
study that, a technological upgrading process is determined by the sectoral system dynamics of 
the industry concerned besides macro policy sets and strategic decisions of firms. As illustrated 
in the Figure 3, the effect of policies in the technological upgrading process on sectoral level is 
based on how efficient the innovation system is as an interface.  
   Each technological upgrading process will emerge from the interaction of supply and demand 
(Xi et al. 2009). In the sectoral innovation system, demand should not be perceived merely as the 
simple aggregate of the mass of consumers or similar buyers, but as the combination of 
heterogeneous agents interacting with producers through different means (Malerba, 2006:391). 
Therefore, it may be depicted as a factor that is both influenced by the policy and also routing the 
technological development in the sector through effecting strategic decisions of the firms. The 
supply side of the upgrading process is constituted by the growth of firms based on different set 
of skills and resources. Macro policies and their meso-level influence channels have impact on 
the technological skill build-up of the firms. Factors having impact on different development 
performances of the Korean and Turkish automotive industry are summarized below across this 
conceptual framework. 
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Figure 3: The conceptual SSI Framework of Technological Upgrading 
 
Source:  Prepared by utilization from Xi et al. 2009 and Tuncel & Olmezogulları, 2010 
 
 
4.1. Sectoral Latecomer Strategies of S Korea and Turkey: Upgrading vs. Lock-in   
 
  The trend of the global automotive industry outside developed countries displays a shape that 
may basically be discussed by two development path. While the first path involves countries 
pursuing a successful strategy to catch up developed countries and turning out to be global 
producers with their own proprietary brands ( for example S.Korea, and partially China and 
India), the second path hosts countries abandoning the import substitution policies and 
demonstrating the achievement of integrating its key industry set up in the form of joint ventures, 
and the subsidiary industry surrounding it, into the global production system as a production base 
(for example South Africa, Brazil, Turkey, Czech Republic). While the share of research and 
development, and design in value added generated throughout the production process 
consistently rises, the share of manufacture gradually shrinks.   Therefore, those dominating the 
processes of R&D, production of the idea, and design have the capability to deploy the 
manufacturing phase of production in any segment of the world that best suits their interests. For 
this reason, development orientation of the automotive industry in countries involved in the 
second group is shaped based on strategical decisions of the global licensor giants. 
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     While the South Korean automotive industry has turned out to be a prominent producer 
running its own global brand, the Turkish automotive industry rather reveals a profile of being 
the production base of global enterprises. The foremost reason underlying the Turkish 
automotive industry's failure to display technological upgrading as successful as the South 
Korean case is the lock-in dynamics of the path taken by the industry at the initial conditions 
(organization and institutional structure).3  
     The Figure 4 comparatively illustrates the development paths respectively followed by the 
Turkish and South Korean automotive industries.  Of strategies discussed by Wong (1999), the 
one studied within the context of development strategies for the Turkish automotive industry was 
implemented by South Korea before, yielding a co-development of process and product 
technology. Korean automotive industry has pursued the “Reverse Product Life Cycle Strategy” 
as its development strategy. The root motive of this achievement should be explored in the 
development policy pursued by that country. Instead of implementing policies as to the whole 
economy, the state focused on strategic industries and implemented selective policies for 
flourishing them. Support extended to major enterprises involved in the automotive industry 
along this prospect has been decisive in the evolution of the industry. Like in the case of 
Hyundai, the paramount enterprise of the Korean automotive industry today, major licensor firms 
start manufacturing through mimicking across the vision of developing their own cars rather than 
standing as installers. Driven by the technological capability background supported by local 
technological efforts, the firms managed to start developing their own designs. Throughout this 
period, the state has intervened in the market and assumed a regulating and guiding role across 
long-term development objectives of the industry. 
          On the other hand, the Turkish automotive industry has pursued the "Reverse Value Chain 
Strategy" as its development strategy. It is obvious that, rather than being a designed preference, 
this represents a development process dependent upon the path shaped by initial conditions 
Major firms of the Turkish automotive industry were set up through license contracts and started 
their initial operations on a limited facility scale in line with import substitution policies. 
Through means of conservation provided by the state, a subsidiary industry surrounding the main 
industry appeared with a view to nationalizing the inputs employed in production. The subsidiary 
industry starting to flourish kept running on an inferior scale and at a low technological level. 
                                               
3 All development paths which have path dependent features, relate beginnings condition of system. For instance if a 
firm (or group of firm) select a specific innovation or technological upgrading path at the beginning, it may utilize 
some advantages (first mover) and achieve upgrading. Because of organizational and instructional conditions, the 
others may choose different development path. On the other hand, both group risk being lock-in to these specifics 
path through various self-reinforcing effects (Fagerberg, 2006). 
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While such inferior scale narrowed down the practical means of technology, it has constituted a 
barrier to the local technological endeavour. In particular, the common behaviour of firms to start 
producing through license contracts paved the way for foreign-source dependency in terms of 
technology that is also experienced as a trouble today. Assembly companies set up first displayed 
a development on process engineering. And these firms turned out to be thriving manufacturers 
based on process improvements. In harmony with global trends, they started to target high-
quality production starting with the second half of 1980s. And 1990s became the starting era of 
comprehensive efforts involving product development and design processes. The firms started to 
reveal a composition where technical departments sprout R&D units, R&D staff is employed and 
R&D projects are created. Major licensor industries have supported this process as the presence 
of surrounding manufacturers with the capability of modifying designed products would drop 
down their costs (Tuncel and Olmezogulları, 2010. While firms, standing as high-quality 
manufacturers on one side, have turned out to be the major manufacturer and exporter of 
particular product ranges of licensor enterprises, they have also constituted the part of design and 
test processes associated with these products. Surrounding firms have started to get articulated 
into the design processes of licensor enterprises as a co-designer. However, they keep dependent 
to the major enterprise for technology development, R&D project design and setting of supply 
policies. Therefore, they have no opportunity to reach the "Own Brand Manufacturing (OBM)" 
phase that constitutes the final step of the development strategy. They rather keep locked in as a 
co-designer at the manufacturing phase, the second step along this path. In particular, 
manufacturing of complicated systems such as motors, gearboxes etc. reveals a higher degree of 
dependency (Akarsoy. 
      Current development level and upgrading possibilities of the automotive industry in Turkey 
should be assessed individually for each different vehicle segment. The development process for 
the manufacturing of passenger cars seems locked in at phase B. Switch to brand manufacturing 
appears impossible. Today, neither Turkey nor any other country has the chance of brand 
manufacturing, particularly as much as passenger cars are concerned. Therefore, resource 
planning should be focussed on higher added values, particularly in favour of R&D design and 
associated activities. From this point of view, Turkey has the potential to exceed its standing as a 
production and export base and turn out to be a design and R&D venue. Enhancing testing means 
and elevating R&D investments in this process would reinforce the standing of passenger vehicle 
manufacturers as an “Original Co-Designer Manufacturer”. On the other hand, the bus and truck 
segment promises a development path deep into further stages. This field hosts both set of firms 
manufacturing under contract and operating on 100% domestic capital. Turkey has attained a 
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very crucial standing in global bus manufacturing arena, and has its own designs in this segment. 
In particular, domestically-financed firms have taken major steps towards branding. There are 
two potential upgrading paths for this segment: 
      The first one is the path from phase B to C1. This is a potential route rather for firms 
manufacturing under contract. At this stage, the firm produces its own design, introduces the 
vehicle as an idea, but markets its product under the brand of the licensor. A major restriction 
along this path is the set of barriers to the elevation of the nationalization rate.  In an aura where 
motors and gearboxes are imported, it seems unlikely for firms to upgrade to "Original Idea 
Manufacturers (OIM)". However, there are fully Turkish-design diesel motors for use in heavy 
commercial vehicles (trucks and trailers) segment4. These firms need to lay emphasis on co-
design efforts with domestic suppliers capable of manufacturing technology-intensive systems 
besides design processes. The second path is the one from phase B to C2 that is the own brand 
manufacturing phase. This route appears possible for domestically-financed own brand 
manufacturers. In particular, Turkey displays this potential for the bus and minibus segment. The 
design and branding process is coming up with success.   
   
Figure 4:  Upgrading Strategies vs. Lock-in Dynamics of Automotive Industry in Turkey 
and South Korea 
 
Source: Author 
                                               
4  “Ecotorq” developed by Ford Otosan is the maiden diesel engine of Turkey designed from the scratch.  The 
project was run in cooperation with Robert Bosch and Australia's AVL.  
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       Main automotive companies of Turkey have gained competence in conformity assessment 
(quality, standards, documentation, accreditation, etc.) (Çakar, 2007). However, it is unlikely to 
argue the same for the capability of developing future technologies on product basis. Such firms, 
which are failing to conceive the foreign main shareholder as the resource of the technological 
know-how and mobilize the in-house R&D process or universities in the country as know-how 
resources, have remained incapable of producing product technologies (Tuncel and Taşkın, 
2007). To overcome the lock-in prevailing in abovementioned segments, the industry needs a 
strategic move that the state will support through selective policies. However, it should be noted 
that, the Lisbon Strategy, shaping the general framework of EU technology policies that Turkey 
has to pursue on account of the current EU accession process, constitutes the utmost institutional 
barrier to implementing such sort of selective policies (Soyak, 2005). 
 
4.2. Tecnological Capability Building and Characteristics of the Technological Regime: 
  The automotive sector carries the technological regime characteristics of the Schumpeterian 
Mark II model. The sector has high level of cumulativeness on firm level, systematic information 
structure based on implicit knowledge, high appropriability conditions and opportunity 
conditions at medium depth. Technological skill build-up in the sector takes place based on the 
dynamics of these technological regime characteristics. The automotive sector also stands as an 
industry where learning by doing, using and interacting has an impact on innovation. Therefore, 
developing the learning processes within the firm and build-up of the firm-specific "know-how" 
is of crucial essence. This in turn leads to concentration of innovation in geographical terms. 
Coordination and management of implicit and codified knowledge within a system at different 
levels raises the significance of spatial proximity. Efficient transfer of system-specific knowledge 
becomes dependent upon relationships where face-to-face interactions come to the foreground 
and proximity between moments grows. 
   The Korean state has systematically supported industry since the establishment of the 
automotive industry. The industry was safeguarded by tariffs for the sake of bringing competitive 
advantages in the sector. Additionally, the state intervened in the market to regulate the market 
structure. This intervention was aimed at resolving issues hindering the development such as 
limited scale and excess capacity. Operation of big-scale firms of the automotive sector within a 
marginally competitive environment has accelerated technological learning processes elicited by 
scale advantages. Existence of several financially-sound firms in the sector has contributed to the 
creation of resources that may be allocated to in-house R&D processes. Internalization of 
technology and developing technologies internalized through R&D expenditures has contributed 
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to collective development of product and process technologies of high-scale enterprises engaged 
in the sector like Hyundai. Being initially oriented in domestic market, industry successfully 
opened up into foreign markets through the technological skill build-up gained in the process of 
time. In the automotive sector, transfer of the implicit knowledge build-up is crucial for the 
innovation process. By landing staff with high field experience from foreign enterprises, Hyundai 
contributed to its own knowledge build-up process. Supporting cooperation efforts between the 
key and subsidiary industry has speeded up knowledge transfer between the parent company and 
its suppliers. As a consequence, the country managed to implement a more appropriate policy set 
capable of contributing to the innovation process in line with the technological regime 
particularities of the automotive industry. Such appropriate policies have speeded up the build-up 
of technological capability in the sector. 
  On the other hand, demonstrating a growth starting with the second half of 1960s, the Turkish 
automotive sector was set up as an assembly industry aimed at meeting the domestic car demand 
thanks to the customs shield brought up by the import substitution period. Domestic enterprises 
such as Oyak Renault, Tofaş, Otosan appearing on the stage under the license of global own 
brand manufacturers prioritized the development of manufacturing processes. And this priority 
has accelerated know-how build-up in the sector. Considering the fact that new entries in the 
global industry are fairly limited, the common behaviour of running the firms incorporated in 
Turkey as a joint venture has prevented these firms to become independent and build new brands 
like contrary to the Hyundai case. Turkish firms setting up their manufacturing in reliance to the 
old production lines and moulds of central countries experienced the issue of undercapacity due 
to weakness in domestic demand, and could not duly benefit from the learning processes, the 
decisive factor of technological development in the sector. For this reason, the sector faced a low 
productivity level and poor product quality (Ansal, 1990). Dependence of Turkish firms to 
foreign partners prevented these firms from carrying out independent research and development 
projects, remaining as a major barrier to technological upgrading. 
 
 
4.3. Actors and Network: 
  While the innovation process takes place locally within the firm, non-firm actors and 
relationships built by firms with these actors have a critical influence in this process as well. 
Non-firm actors that we can classify as universities, public institutions, research organizations, 
industrial societies and business associations constitute, integrally with the firm, the components 
of the sectoral innovation system. Particularly public authorities in charge of regulating the 
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sector, and specialists of these authorities have a major influence on the sectoral development 
process. The Korean state has regulated the automotive sector, to which it attached strategical 
priority, through sectoral plans. Networks built between the sate and private sector to route 
economy across development objectives performed very well. Along with their specialized 
bureaucracies, public organizations such as the "Economic Planning Board", "Ministry of Trade 
and Industry" were in charge of elaborating and enforcing the industrial policies of public 
organizations. These organizations played principal role in equipping the sector with competitive 
edges through a disciplined and performance-based incentive system. Particularly in 1980s, 
enhancement of design capabilities became decisive in setting the right move of the Korean 
automotive industry to foreign marketplaces. Close relationships built with actors such as 
universities and research organizations at this phase  
  In Turkey, "State Planning Organization" became the chief actor of economy particularly during 
the import substitution industry period pursued between 1960 and 1980. Like the planning 
institution in the Korean case, this institution did not have the sufficient autonomy, and employed 
policy instruments towards whole industry instead of sectoral policies. Lack of a certain 
technological policy prevented the sector from producing a technological skill build-up. Actors 
such as societies and chambers involved in the sector acted as an interest group particularly in 
sharing the profits yielded by tariff protection. The sector could not carry out thriving 
cooperation activities with institutions such as universities. As a matter of fact, the Turkish 
automotive firms could not carry out a serious research and development activity until the second 
half of 1990s. Efforts for product and process technology development could be initiated only in 
late 1990s through the support of parent companies. Even today, long-term research 
collaborations built with universities and research institutions are quite weak. 
 
4.5. Institutions: 
Institutions are limitations introduced by people to shape interactions between them, and they 
constitute a framework for these interactions. Institutions may have sectoral identity as well as a 
national one. Patent system, financial institutions, education system, labour markets and 
conducting business culture are major institutions of an economy. The automotive sector also 
stands as an industry where learning by doing, using and interacting has an impact on innovation. 
Therefore, developing the learning processes within the firm and build-up of the firm-specific 
"know-how" is of crucial essence. For this reason, to elevate the "assimilation capacity" that is 
decisive in the learning process, engineers specialized in automotive technologies and 
intermediate staff trained on automotive manufacturing should be recruited. In the automotive 
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industry, particularly privatized labour markets and educational institutions play a very critical 
role. Through well-done educational schemes, Korea could create a labour market consisting of 
specialized engineers to be employed in the sector. Additionally, forms of doing business based 
on mutual trust reduce costs of operation and yield substantial economical gains. Existence of 
major family enterprises engaged in distinctive business fields has been of crucial essence in a 
flourishing Korean automotive industry. Both in acquiring and learning new technologies, and 
thanks to its impact channels, chaebols became influential in the process of overseas expansion. 
A very significant factor for such sort of collaborative activities, trust has a vital place between 
firms. Trust factor stands as a crucial illustrative factor particularly in social network topology 
analyses. In ensuring a successful economical up growth in Asian countries, Confucius highlights 
the factor of trust based on primary relationships introduced by religion (Fukuyama, 1995). State 
support for strategic sectors has been the driving power of technological breakthrough in an aura 
where institution such as venture capital is underdeveloped. 
  In Turkey, creation of labour markets suiting both occupational training and sector has failed. 
Particularly through liberalization policies implemented after 1980s, state's weight on economy 
diminished, and market became the decisive mechanism entirely in resource allocation. Lack of 
institutions suitable for the technology finance, poor state incentive mechanisms and paucity of 
resources hampered technological growth. On the other hand, both the state-private sector 
collaboration and the internal cooperation within the private sector stagnated due to the failure of 
creating networks in the business conduct culture. Like in the Korean case, this condition 
obstructed the formation of catalyst interfaces. 
 
4.6. Demand: 
 
As to Korea, the country set its sight on overseas expansion in the automotive industry that it has 
considered to be a strategic sector from the very beginning. Poor domestic demand in Korea 
designated vehicle manufacturers as an export-priority strategy for the sake of utilizing scale 
advantages.   Deep shrinkage of the domestic market caused by loss of profit due to the second 
oil crisis accelerated the overseas expansion process. Facilitated by state support, Korean firms 
started to market products to international markets in 1975. Manufacturing cheap and poor-
quality vehicles during the initial period, the industry managed to penetrate into the markets of 
particularly underdeveloped countries through low-price policy. Starting with early 1980s, 
Hyundai managed to penetrate into the US market. Aspiration to build cars meeting the demands 
of consumers in the US market speeded up the technological breakthrough of the company. 
Starting with 1990s, export was directed to new marketplaces such as Europe, Middle East and 
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South Africa driven by shrinkage in the US market. Particularly triggered by the overseas 
expansion process, the strong demand factor became a decisive factor in the development 
perspective of the Korean automotive industry. 
 Starting with the incorporation period, the Turkish automotive industry set its sight on 
manufacturing towards the domestic market safeguarded by customs tariffs. Due to insufficient 
demand from the isolated domestic market, optimal plant scales could not be built and therefore 
scale advantages could not be availed of. Since domestic manufacturers have inferior income 
levels, cost effectiveness came to the foreground as a product preference criterion, pushing the 
quality criteria into the background. Due to the paucity of competitive edges gained, the period of 
overseas expansion for the industry was delayed. Under isolated domestic market conditions, 
current firms acquired the obtained the licenses of foreign brands and opted for remanufacturing 
their old models for the domestic market. Starting with the second half of 1990s, the sector 
displayed a rapid overseas expansion and enhanced means of export. In parallel to the economic 
growth, the domestic market also enjoyed an expansion, yet the Customs Union Convention 
executed with the European Union in 1995 paved the way for an intense inflow of import 
vehicles into the domestic market. This condition caused an augmented import penetration rate of 
industry. And this stands as a major issue for the Turkish automotive sector. On the other hand, 
in the vehicle segment particularly where the design capabilities of Turkey are developed, strong 
international demand originating from Middle Eastern markets highly contributed to the up 
growth of the sector. Foreign demand is of great essence in terms of the sector's standing in 
economy for Turkey, being the manufacturing base of global brands in the passenger car 
segment. 
 
5. Conclusion: 
 
 The assessment of the set-up and evolution of and current progress attained by the South Korean 
and Turkish automotive industries reveals that, despite similar prevailing conditions at the start 
up, the efforts for establishing these two distinctive industries displayed varied performances due 
to factors having influence at macro, micro and meso level. Decisive factors in the outcome are 
different industrialization strategies pursued by these two countries, distinctive international 
standings, different industry policy sets implemented and difference in the administrative 
capacity of these states. This study focuses particularly on the dynamics of meso level, rather 
ignored to date in discussing the late industrialization process. Since each sector has different 
development dynamics, they need to be supported by different policy sets. This approach also 
contributes to considering how selective policies should be designed. Of course, all technological 
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development processes contain a margin of uncertainty, making it impossible to seamlessly 
manage the whole process by means of policy instruments. And some random events may cause 
permanent lock-ins on this technological development process. However, it should be noted that, 
all efforts for technological development are the outcome of human actions for a deliberative 
purpose. And each potential action set meant to guide a process is designed to attain particular 
purposes.5 And realization channels of this design, links and all actors involved in this process 
constitute the social, economical and institutional background of the industrialization process. 
Historical consideration of the matter reveals that all successful moves for economical 
development have owed to the combination of right policies with right institutions (Chang, 
2002). Technology is not merely a practical know-how transforming inputs to outputs in a 
manufacturing process. Conceptualizing technology in a holistic approach would better enlighten 
the aspects of technology contributing to the quantitative and qualitative transformation of an 
economy. This framework also stresses the capacity of right policies and institutions to manage 
technological developments in a totalitarian approach. As highlighted by Richard Nelson, besides 
the change in physical technologies during economical development, other decisive factor is 
social technologies evolving along physical technologies. Social technology is defined as forms 
of human interactions unlike physical engineering technologies  (Langlois, 2007:6). These links 
and interaction channels appear as policy interfaces shaping the developmental direction of the 
system. Examining both country experiences from a comparative point of view, it can be 
observed that Korea, actively implementing the industrial policy interface across the 
technological upgrading strategy, outperforms Turkey. While the Korean industry has turned out 
to be a own brand manufacturing sector exporting vehicles to the whole world, the Turkish 
automotive industry acquired a standing as an assembly base functioning under the license of 
global enterprises that are own brand manufacturers. Despite a particular achievement for 
different vehicle segments (buses, midibuses), Turkey much falls behind Korea in terms of the 
current progress attained in this industry.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 For example, Brain Arthur points out that the  technology relate to human purpose. “I will define a technology quite 
simply as a means to fulfill a human purpose. The purpose may be explicit; or it may be hazy, multiple, and 
changing. But whether its purpose is well defined or not, a technology is a means to carrying out a purpose” 
(Arthur, 2007:276). 
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